We analyze a general framework for modeling agents whose utility is derived from both their actions and the perceptions of others about their type. We show that such perception games always have equilibria, and discuss two natural refinements. We demonstrate the applicability of our framework in a variety of contexts, with a particular emphasis on privacy-related issues.
Introduction
Privacy, or rather the lack thereof, has been a part of the popular debate over the course of the past century and, with the prevalence of the internet, even more so over the course of the last decade. As more of our daily activities take place online the digital footprints we leave behind us for others to track, save, analyze and possibly distribute have become unprecedented. Some obvious examples are our shopping habits (e.g., Amazon, eBay), reading interests (e.g., Wordpress, CNN.com), general interests (e.g., Google), and networks of friends and colleagues (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn). This relentless tracking of our activities puts forward a variety of new social dilemmas, concerns and challenges, most of which fall under the general theme of privacy.
By and large the ability to collect and process a vast amount of individual information has clear commercial and social benefits. Firms who collect and analyze such data can translate this to profits and societies that accumulate individual data produce knowledge, which in turn translates to social welfare (e.g., individuals' medical data transformed to better understanding of the biological process which can then be translated into better medical care). On the other hand many individuals and policymakers continually express their concerns for this relentless tracking of individuals due to privacy invasion. What is the Nature of these privacy concerns? What is it that individuals do not want others to know and why? It seems that such concerns come on three different levels:
• An embarrassment derived directly from others knowing some action an individual has taken even if that sheds no new light on how the individual is perceived. For example, although it is commonly assumed that everyone consumes some level of adult entertainment, an individual might feel uncomfortable with be observed when doing so;
• A concern from inferences other make about me from observing my action. Such inferences might relate to various aspects of my personality such as attitude towards risk, altruism, my consumption preferences, etc.;
• A concern for giving others information they can use in future interactions and possibly have, as a result, the upper hand in some future (specified or unspecified) interaction.
For example, hiding one's juvenile crime record so future job applications are not influenced by some misdemeanor.
In the standard economic and game-theoretic modeling paradigm these three levels of concern translate to:
• Dis-utility from others observing my action, which can be encoded into the utility function. This can be modeled in the context of a simple game with complete information,
• What others learn about my type, which can be captured in a model of incomplete information; and
• The strategic options available to others in the future due to finer information. This can be captured in a model of a repeated game.
In this paper we study how privacy concerns impact individual's decisions. In particular, our work is motivated by the second layer of the three mentioned above. In other words, the focus of this paper is on the connection between the individual's action in a given setting (in a "game") and the inferences one can make about the individual's fundamental traits or type (which we refer to as one's "perception" of the individual). We neglect the first and third aforementioned layers as their theoretical treatment is already captured by standard game theoretic models: The implications of taking an observable action can be captured by the utility function in a one shot game (or in the case of a mixed action this is captured by psychological games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) ), whereas the implications on future interactions with players who observe your actions is an integral part of the analysis of repeated games with perfect vs. imperfect monitoring.
The connection between an individual's choice of an action and the resulting inferences about the individual's fundamental traits goes beyond privacy. Whereas privacy suggests that individuals do not want others to learn anything about them there are cases where an individual would like to take an action so people do learn who he really is (anti-privacy behavior) or, in other cases, he may want to mislead others to believe he is someone else.
There are also complex scenarios where one type of an individual is concerned with privacy while another is neutral about privacy (e.g., homosexuals vs. heterosexuals in the 70s) or even an exhibitionist. Thus, there is a large spectrum of the way people think of their perception and so, even though privacy is our leading motivation, we propose a model of perception games which goes beyond modeling privacy. The crux of perception games is that individuals' utilities take into account the others' ex-post perceptions as well as the (standard) action profile and actual type.
This basic idea underlying perception games, that players account for their perception when deciding on an optimal course of action, is not new, and has already been studied in the literature in various other contexts. The research on conspicuous goods, for example, acknowledges that such goods provide a dual benefit-a direct consumption effect as well as an indirect effect due to the signal it sends (I enjoy driving my new hybrid Toyota Prius as it is a quality car, and in addition I am perceived by others as environmentally friendly, which I am happy about). The literature on conformity similarly studies situations where persistent norms emerge as opposed to transient ones (fads) in a society where perceptions matter.
Finally, the literature on self-image also connects action and perception. We provide a more detailed account of these strands of the literature in the sequel. The model of perception games is an abstract generalization of these aforementioned models and can serve a wider variety of research issues, such as privacy.
Privacy
Although perception games are a flexible modeling tool our main motivation, as well as the leading examples, are all related to the issue of privacy. Privacy has already become an object of academic study within fields such as law, philosophy, statistics and computer science. Surprisingly little has been written on privacy from an economics perspective, despite the fact that many privacy-related issues have a clear economic aspect (e.g., the value of personal information and the market for such information) or can naturally be treated with methodologies developed by economists and game theorists (as demonstrated in this work). We predict that privacy will become a central topic in economics, and this work serves as a small brick in the upcoming scientific construct developed by economists.
A lion's share of the academic work around privacy takes interest in the role of society in limiting the potential abuse of individuals by institutions and governments due to the ever-growing available personal data. Indeed, the study of privacy is typically concerned with the collection, usage, and dissemination of information about individuals. The first public treatment of privacy, as far as we know, relates to information collection and the protection against eavesdropping. This can be traced back to to the end of the 15 th century with the English maxim that the home is one's castle (Solove, 2006) . 1 The academic debate around the collection, usage and dissemination of information on individuals by firms, institutions and governments, has the following two common threads.
First, much of this literature studies the social efficiency implications of laws designed to limit such activities. It is no wonder that much of the literature, and in particular that written by economic scholars, argues that such limitations have social costs in terms of social welfare. For example, limiting employers' access to past criminal records in a given labor market may result in inefficient matching of workers to firms and possibly drive away workers who have nothing to hide to other markets. A second common thread of many academic studies is that it is (implicitly) assumed that the individual has limited control over access to his information. For example, an individual has no control over whether his doctors can access his medical information, whether his lenders can access his credit history and whether the government can access his criminal records. Thus, it is a matter of regulation whether access to such information, as well its storage and its distribution, should be limited.
Furthermore, the limited literature in economics that studies privacy has an additional common thread which is that privacy is treated as an intermediate rather than a final good.
In other words, people desire privacy as a means to some end, which is in the form of a standard economic outcome. For example, people would like to hide their criminal record in order to get a better job. Similarly, privacy related to one's medical history may be desirable for getting better and cheaper health insurance and financial records are sometimes hidden to ensure better credit and loans. In other disciplines, such as computer science, often (the preservation of) privacy is viewed as the objective function. We elaborate on this in our literature survey below when we discuss the notion of "differential privacy". The current paper takes a different perspective. We assert that in many decision problems the action we take is recorded and so informs the observer who tracks this data about who we are, what we like and dislike, what our weaknesses and strengths are, and so on.
Thus, when we take an action in such a privacy-less world we often account for what others might learn about us when we take this action. Our focus, therefore, is not on privacy enhancement but rather on the implications of the lack of privacy on the way decisions are made.
Thus, our study is different from much of the literature on privacy with respect to all three common threads mentioned earlier. First, we study privacy from a personal point of view rather than society's point of view. We model the implications of privacy concerns (and not of regulation) on the individual decision making process.
Second, we assume the individual has control over the information accessible to others.
His private information is indeed his own secret, but his actions may signal something about these secrets. Taking an action partly reveals one's secret and therefore privacy enters into individuals' strategic considerations when forming their optimal action. In particular, we are not concerned with other's ability to access one's private information by means of an attack (e.g., tapping / eavesdropping). Instead, we are concerned with information implicitly leaked via one's actions, and the effect of this leakage on one's choice of action.
Finally, we depart from most of the (economics) literature in that we consider privacy as an argument of the utility function. 2 In our treatment the individual's privacy, similarly to standard consumption goods, is a component of a bundle from which one derives utility.
Thus, when taking an action in order to maximize utility, the privacy aspect cannot be ignored. This contrasts with other work on privacy where the primitives of the model do not assume the utility functions account directly for privacy. To motivate this approach consider the recent NSA scandal from early 2013, where it was discovered that the National Security Agency (NSA) taps communication (voice and electronic) of US citizens as well as foreigners without due process. The public upheaval was not about concerns of how the NSA will use individuals' data, rather it was more about the fact that their liberty and privacy has been violated (Washington Post-ABC News Poll, 2013). The mere violation seemed to be the underlying reason for the public rage.
Perception games
To capture the interplay between strategy and perception we propose to model players using an extension of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) paradigm. Similarly to SEU, a player has a subjective probability distribution over the underlying fundamentals and optimizes some expected utility using this distribution. However, whereas SEU accounts for a player's action and state of Nature, here we also use a player's perception as an argument of the utility function. The difficulty in extending the model is the inherent cross-dependence between actions and perceptions. Taking a certain action induces a certain perception, for which the given action might not be optimal. However, resorting to the new optimal action will change the induced perception which may, in turn, render the new action inferior. To capture this interdependence we leave the classical realm of a single decision maker and consider a game theoretic approach that is reminiscent of signaling games. A solution to the decision making problem, in the new model, rather than being some optimal action, is an equilibrium notion composed of actions and perceptions where optimality and Bayesian consistency both play a role: given the strategy, the perception must be Bayesian consistent with the prior subjective distribution; given the perception, the strategy must maximize expected utility.
More specifically, we resort to Harsanyi's notion of types. An individual's private infor-mation is his type, and so we identify privacy concerns (and more generally, perceptions) with an opponent's probability distribution over the individual's type. Note that since the decision maker's actions may be type-dependent this probability distribution may also depend on the action the individual takes. We demonstrate this in the following example:
Example 1 (Inspired by Example 3.1 in Nissim et al. (2012) ) An individual may hold one of two political views, denoted ℓ(ef t) and r(ight). This individual can subscribe to one (and only one) of two political blogs, denoted L and R. Assuming the individual suspects no one is following him he prefers to follow the blog that corresponds to his type.
We calibrate utilities such that reading the "correct" blog is worth 1 while reading the other blog is worth 0. In addition, the individual wants to maintain his political views concealed but is concerned that what he reads online may be monitored. We assign a dis-utility of one to the case that the opponent knows for sure the type of the individual and a dis-utility of zero if the opponent learns nothing new about the individual beyond what he already knew before action was taken by the individual. What will our individual do in this one-shot dilemma?
Before turning to the analysis of this decision problem we observe the following claims, which are independent of any reasonable definition of "privacy": (1) If the individual has a deterministic strategy that separates his two types (he is either always truthful or always lies) then his type can be fully deduced from his action. As per our assumptions, this results in an additional dis-utility of 1. (2) If the individual takes the same action for both types (possibly mixed) then nothing can be inferred from observing the blog he reads and so his privacy is not jeopardized and no dis-utility is incurred.
Is being truthful optimal? Being truthful leads to an award of 1 from the optimal action yet a complete revelation of the political views, and thus an additional dis-utility of 1. The total utility is therefore 0. This is inferior to any random announcement which is typeindependent. Any such announcement leads to an a posteriori expected award between zero and one as privacy is not jeopardized. However, any such random announcement cannot be optimal. Note that in the interim stage, once the individual realizes its own type, he should deviate and read the corresponding optimal blog. Given the initial strategy the deviation cannot be detected and his political views are not jeopardized.
In the standard literature a player's type encodes a (cardinal) preference over some space of outcomes, typically modeled by the action profile in a game. In our model the type also encodes a (cardinal) preference over some space, which is a product of the space of outcomes and the space of all probability distributions over the set of types. This ad-ditional component is designed to capture the fact that our player is concerned with what others think of him (that is, others' beliefs about his type). To be more accurate it is not what others think of him but rather what one thinks others think of him. Thus, in our model privacy concerns are themselves type-dependent. One type of an individual (say, the 'paranoid' type) may attribute a lot of weight to whether people think he is paranoid whereas another type of the individual (the 'self assured' type) may not care what people think.
Our contribution
The main contribution of this work can be seen as a twofold. First, we provide a general framework-perception games-for modeling players whose utility is derived from actions as well as perceptions. Thus, we provide a uniform framework for a variety of models that already exist in the literature as well as new models that capture settings where perceptions and actions are intertwined (such as privacy). Our first theorem states that any such game has an equilibrium. This puts to rest possible question marks which may hover above existing papers that discuss equilibria in perception games but do not go through the exercise of proving its existence. In addition, we discuss two natural refinements of equilibrium. Second, through a sequence of applications we demonstrate the potential contribution of perception games in a variety of contexts, with a particular emphasis on privacy-related issues.
Related literature
There is a large and growing literature on privacy in various academic disciplines, such as law, philosophy, and computer science -see the recent surveys of Solove (2006 , 2011 ), Nissenbaum (2009 , and Dwork and Smith (2010) , respectively. Most of this literature does not treat the behavioral implications of (the lack of) privacy but rather discusses the pros and cons of privacy and the related regulation.
More closely related to this paper is the work on privacy in economics, much of which is surveyed by Hui and Png (2006) . As mentioned above, that literature examines the policy question of how the revelation of individuals' private information affects welfare. Since privacy is typically treated as an intermediate good, it is somewhat unsurprising that the resulting literature is ambivalent about the welfare effects of privacy regulation. A particularly simple and compelling illustration along these lines is made by Taylor and Wagman (forthcoming) , who show that stronger privacy regulation can be both beneficial and harm-ful to consumers and firms, depending on the details of the market. This paper, in contrast, examines privacy through the lens of an individual decision maker, and utilizes game theoretic arguments in its treatment of privacy concerns. As such, this paper is closely related to various strands of the game theory literature, and in particular to work on psychological games, social image, signaling games, and repeated games.
Psychological games (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1988; Geanakoplos et al., 1989) are games in which the utilities of players depend not only on all players' actions, but also on their beliefs about others' strategy profiles, as well as beliefs over such beliefs, and so on. Psychological games have been used to model emotions such as surprise, embarrassment, and guilt, among others. Our paper is similar in that our model involves a decision maker whose utility depends on more than his action. Unlike psychological games, our model is rooted in a setting of incomplete information and the additional element that a decision maker accounts for is a belief about his type, rather than about his strategy profile. The model of psychological games has been extended to dynamic games by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) . Their work focuses on games with complete information, but they argue informally that the model and solution existence results extend to games of incomplete information. Such an extension seemingly generalizes perception games and renders our modeling exercise redundant.
However, that is not entirely accurate, for two reasons. First, Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) do not provide a formal treatment of the existence result, and second, their model assumes a common prior whereas our approach is entirely subjective. All these models account for a full hierarchy of beliefs and consequently make the exposition quite involved and applicability of the model quite complex. In contrast, most of the applications for the model provided by these authors and others consider only the first level of beliefs and ignore the rest of the hierarchy, as do perception games. Thus, one can view perception games as a subjective and more tractable version of psychological games with incomplete information.
Perception games are also reminiscent of signaling games (Sobel, 2009 ). In a signaling game an informed player sends a message to an uninformed player. The latter takes an action and both obtain a reward that is a function of the information, the message and the action. This is very similar to our notion of a single player perception game, where the uninformed player takes no action but rather forms a belief that is Bayesian consistent with the message and strategy of the informed player. However, if one replaces the belief formation of the uniformed player in our perception game with a strategic player who is asked to provide a prediction over the information held by the informed player and will be rewarded according to a proper scoring rule (see Brier, 1950) then one is back at a signaling game with a proper mapping of the equilibria. As opposed to psychological games, signaling games are stripped away from a full hierarchy of beliefs and so provide a more tractable framework. However, similarly to psychological games, signaling games typically assume a common prior, whereas perception games do not. In addition, perception games extend beyond the asymmetric informed vs. uninformed player setting, and allow for both players to have partial information and for simultaneous bi-directional signaling to occur. In fact, even in the model we refer to as the one player perception game the virtual player (whom we later refer to as "Big Brother") may be one of a variety of types.
Similarly to perception games, the literature on social image and conspicuous consumption studies optimal choice of action when players care about the beliefs of others about their own type. For example, Bernheim (1994) , Glazer and Konrad (1996) , and Ireland (1994) study conformity, charity, and status, respectively, under the assumption that players wish to be perceived as "higher" (e.g., wealthier) types rather than "lower" types. By and large, one may view all these models as instances of perception games with a very specific structure:
• All these models, including models by Becker (1974) , Bénabou and Tirole (2006) and more recently Rayo (2010) , impose an order on the type space. The player, independently of his type, would like to be perceived as similar as possible to some "ideal" type (say, the benevolent type, the wealthy type, the altruistic type, the bold type, etc.) 3 .
• In our general model of perception games, perceptions are captured by distributions over types. However, in many of these models on social image the type set is modeled as an interval on the real line and a perception is simply captured by a single type (and not a distribution). This single type is the "expected" type of the distribution. Thus, these models implicitly assume that the utility functions commute the expectation operator with the argument of perception. To be clearer they assume an equivalence between the following two scenarios: (1) BB does not know what are my political views and assigns a uniform probability to any of the views on the interval spanning from extreme left to extreme right, versus (2) BB is confident I am an extremist, either left or right, and assigns each of these cases a probability of 0.5. In our humble opinion this commutativity assumption is quite limiting.
• In many models on social image an ad-hoc utility structure is imposed on the players.
In particular, most of these models work with additively-separable utility function, where the utility function has two additive components-an "intrinsic" utility component driven by the action profile and an "extrinsic" utility component driven by reputation (perception) effects. Perception games, in contrast, suggest no restriction on the interplay between types, actions, perceptions and utilities.
One can also argue that the theory of equilibrium in repeated games with public or private monitoring is a powerful tool to study the interaction between the current optimal action and the resulting perception (as captured by the information one player has over the other upon monitoring his action) and its implications on future payoffs. For a thorough survey we refer the reader to Mailath and Samuelson (2006) . In this line of work, perceptions play no direct role on determining a player's utility but rather an indirect role through the stream of future payoffs.
Finally, recent work on the border of computer science and game theory makes use of the notion of "differential privacy" (see Dwork and Smith, 2010) to analyze behavior of individuals with privacy concerns (e.g., Nissim et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013) . The notion of differential privacy comes from the challenge of quantifying an upper bound on the privacy loss of a given mechanism in an environment with non-voluntary participation. The notion of differential privacy is not player dependant and hence captures some external (e.g., society's) point of view on privacy breaches. 4 Differential privacy is then adopted to mechanism design with voluntary participation by individualizing the way it is combined with the standard utility notion to generate a new utility function that captures privacy concerns. As with the literature on social image, this line of research assumes some ad-hoc structure on the utility function. In particular, utilities are given in an additively separable structure with the 'privacy component' driven by the notion of differential privacy. Utilizing this in a model of individual behavior in an environment with voluntary participation raises many doubts on the conclusions that can be derived.
Paper structure
In Section 2 we introduce the basic ingredients of a single player perception game. We define an appropriate notion of equilibrium and prove existence. Section 3 provides various examples of single player perception games which relate to the theme of privacy, and Section 4 4 We do not give the actual definition of ε-differential privacy but suffice in mentioning that conceptually it is derived by comparing the (random) outcome of a mechanism in two cases which differ on the value of a single agent. Differential privacy suggests that the worst case difference does not exceed the privacy parameter ε.
contains other examples. We study the equilibria in these examples and derive interesting conclusions. Apparently equilibria of perception games are not unique-in Section 5 we touch on this issue and, inspired by ideas from game theory, suggest some refinement notions. In Section 6 we extend the model of perception games beyond single player model.
We discuss the implications of privacy concerns on efficiency in such settings and demonstrate that the introduction of privacy concerns may, non-intuitively, increase welfare (that is, decisions made by Adam and Eve after eating from the apple can increase their welfare).
Section 7 discusses future research directions and concludes. Finally, some of the proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Single Player Perception Games
Our primary interest is in perception games with a single (active) player, and this is the focus of the current section. The introduction and discussion of multi-player perception games is postponed to Section 6. Our point of departure is the Anscombe-Aumann framework (Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) in which a decision maker (DM) is an expected utility maximizer with respect to some subjective belief (probability distribution) over the unknown state of Nature, which, in turn, is an argument of the DM's utility function. In our model we replace Nature with some other entity we refer to as Big Brother (BB). Whereas Nature is a completely passive entity, BB is not, in the following sense. Although BB cannot take any action, he holds a belief over who DM is, which is updated in a Bayesian manner. This belief, in turn, is an argument in DM's utility function. Complying with the Anscombe-Aumann framework, the distribution over Nature (BB in our model) as well as the belief BB holds over the DM are subjective. We emphasize that the model is subjective and hence the state of BB as well as BB's beliefs could be thought of as artifacts of the DM's perception of reality.
Technically, one can think of our model as a variation on a two player game of incomplete information with the DM modeled as an active player (with a non-trivial set of actions)
and Nature or BB modeled as an inactive player (with a trivial set of actions). Formally, a single player perception game is a tuple (T, V, A, u, β) where:
• T is a finite type space for the active player (the DM);
• V is a finite type space for the inactive player (BB);
• A is a finite action space (for the DM); This model is differentiated from a standard model of (expected) utility maximization in the following aspects:
• A second player: In the standard model the DM need only choose an action. Once the action is determined the state of Nature is revealed and these two determine the DM's utility. 5 In our model there is an inherent second player, Big Brother. In fact, this player may exist in reality or may only be a figment of the DM's imagination.
Although this player may not exist and has no action he plays a crucial role.
• The notion of a type: Similarly to the classical Harsanyi model a player's type (DM's as well as BB's) encodes two important aspects. First, it encodes the utility function of the player. That is, for any player, and given a vector of types, there is a preference over the set on outcomes (which is typically associated with the set of action profiles).
Second, it encodes the belief of an agent over the other agents' types. Consequently, it captures a full heterarchy of beliefs over beliefs, etc.
• The structure of a utility function: Similarly to the Anscombe-Aumann model the type of BB (referred to as the state of Nature by Anscombe and Aumann) determines the DM's utility for each (mixed) outcome. Whereas the set of outcome in the Anscombe-Aumann model coincides with the set of actions available to the DM, in our model it is the product set of actions with the beliefs over the DM's type set (which is the perception the DM has over BB's beliefs over the type set). This is inherently different from the standard approach as this belief is not some abstract consequence of the DM's realized action but is rather a consequence of the DM's mixed action, not only for his realized type but for other types that he could have been.
A strategy for the active player is a vector σ = {σ t } t∈T , where σ t ∈ ∆(A) is the mixed action taken by type t. A perception for type t of the active player is a function
, which represents what an active player of type t believes the inactive player's belief (of some type v ∈ V ) is over the active player's own type following some action a ∈ A. A player's perception is a vector of perceptions, τ = {τ t } t∈T , one for each type. The expected payoff of the active player at type t, given the perception τ t and the strategy σ t ∈ ∆(A) is:
In the Anscombe-Aumann model the DM takes an action that maximizes his expected utility. Here the notion of maximization is misleading and is replaced with a notion of equilibrium. To see this, note that the utility of some action for a player of one type depends on the belief of BB (or rather what the DM believes BB believes) on the type of DM, after seeing his action. However, this belief is generated by Bayes' rule from the initial belief held by BB (or rather an initial belief the DM has about the beliefs of BB) as well as the strategies of all types of the DM.
A perception equilibrium
In our equilibrium notion we will require the DM's perception, τ , to be consistent in a particular sense. But first we require some definitions.
be the probability that the inactive player assigns to the active player being of type t and taking action a, conditional on her playing the strategy profile σ. Then P v (a|σ) = t∈T P v (t, a|σ) is the probability she assigns to the active player taking action a. Let A v σ = {∪t ∈supp(β I (v)) supp(σ(t))}. By definition P v (a|σ) > 0 for all actions in A v σ and so P v (t|a, σ) = Pv(t,a|σ) Pv(a|σ) , the conditional probability that the inactive player of type v assigns to the active player being of type t upon seeing the action a, is well defined for all a ∈ A v σ .
In words, a player's perception in the ex-post stage must be consistent with his ex ante perception vis-á-vis Bayes' rule.
Definition 2 A (subjective) perception equilibrium is a consistent strategy-perception pair
for allσ ∈ ∆(A).
Existence of a perception equilibrium
At this point we make only one technical assumption on the utility function:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 a perception equilibrium exists in any single player perception game.
The proof, which is provided in the Appendix, hinges on Kakutani's fixed-point theorem.
As usual, this involves defining an appropriate best-response correspondence, showing that it is upper-hemicontinuous and convex-valued, and then invoking Kakutani's theorem. The crux of the current proof lies in fixing the perception τ as a function of the strategy, such that the induced best-response correspondence is indeed upper-hemicontinuous. More specifically, in the construction of the best-response correspondence, for each strategy profile σ in the domain we construct a particular consistent τ σ , for which we find the set of bestresponses.
The following example, which is a variant of Example 1, illustrates that without Assumption 1 a perception equilibrium need not exist.
Example 2 The active player, Alice, is of type t ∈ {ℓ, r} with β(1) = β(0) = 0.5, and must choose between actions {L, R}, with a utility of 1 if t = a (the upper case of the type is equal the action) and 0 otherwise. However, suppose that Alice incurs an additional disutility as follows. Let p ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that the inactive player assigns to Alice being of type r. Then both types incur a disutility is −2 whenever p = 0.5, type r incurs a disutility of −2 when p = 1, and type ℓ incurs a disutility of −2 whenever p = 0. The disutility is 0 otherwise.
For any pure and separating strategy profile both players obtain a utility of at most 1 − 2, whereas a deviation would yield 0 and is hence profitable. Suppose the strategy profile is pure and pooling, with both types playing L. Then here type ℓ obtains utility −1, and type r obtains utility −2. But regardless of the perception at action r, type r will strictly benefit from deviating. Finally, as in Example 1 no mixed strategy can be optimal.
Although a proper definition is not given there is no ε-perception equilibrium in this example for small enough ε.
On the structure of the utility function
So far we have not imposed any structure on the function u apart from continuity with respect to perceptions. However, in various examples some additional structure may be assumed, which we now discuss in abstract terms:
the strategy that deterministically plays action a. In words, type t has an optimal action which is independent of his perception. A DM is perception-neutral if every type t ∈ T is perception-neutral.
. That is, the player's utility can be decomposed into two parts: A valuation which is independent of the perception (the material utility) and some additional disutility which is independent of the player's action.
On the structure of beliefs
Even though our approach is subjective, sometimes we will examine equilibria in games with beliefs that satisfy an additional assumption:
Definition 5 In a perception game, the beliefs β satisfy the common prior assumption if the following holds: There exists some distribution η over
For some of our examples additional structure on the beliefs is required:
Definition 6 In a perception game, the beliefs β satisfy the independent types assumption if β satisfies the common prior assumption, and if the prior distribution η guaranteed to exist by Definition 5 is a product distribution over T × V .
Application to Privacy
Recall that the model of a single player perception game was motivated by our quest to understand decision making with privacy concerns. Clearly privacy is a matter of percep-tion. However, not all utility functions in our framework seem adequate to capture privacy concerns. What type of functions should we study to better capture privacy concerns?
We propose two alternative notions of privacy concerns, corresponding to (families of) utility functions. In the first, we assume the DM would not want anything to be learned about him beyond what is already known. In other words, he is happiest whenever BB's posterior belief is equal the prior belief.
Definition 7 A DM of type t ∈ T has upper privacy concerns if for every v ∈ V and a ∈ A,
In words, type t prefers that the strategy disclose nothing about the type beyond BB's initial perception. A DM has upper privacy concerns if he has upper privacy concerns for every type t ∈ T .
Although natural, an upper privacy concern exhibits some logical inconsistency in a dynamic setting. Assume a DM faces two consecutive perception games and assume that there are strategies for both games such that BB does learn about the DM in each but in a way that cancels out. That is, following both games BB's perception is back at its starting point. In the grand game (composed of the two stage games) the DM lands the best perception yet in each stage he does not.
An alternative notion is to assume that the DM may or may not care about BB learning but he mostly does not want BB to know who he is exactly:
Definition 8 A DM of type t ∈ T has lower privacy concerns if for every v ∈ V and a ∈ A, arg min
where χ(t) is the Dirac measure on t.
In words, type t type prefers that his action not fully disclose his type. A DM has lower privacy concerns if he has lower privacy concerns for every type t ∈ T .
A stronger version of privacy than either of the above is the following:
Definition 9 A DM of type t ∈ T has privacy concerns if he has both upper and lower privacy concerns and, in addition, for any 1 ≥ α > γ ≥ 0, every v ∈ V and a ∈ A,
A DM has privacy concerns if he has privacy concerns for every type t ∈ T .
Our final privacy-related definition proposes that if the player cannot maintain the privacy of his type and must fully reveal information, then he prefers to reveal it truthfully.
Such an assumption is appropriate for settings in which individuals may be harmed by incorrect assessments of their types. This assumption is quite reasonable and indeed advocates of privacy regulation often emphasize the importance of allowing individuals to actively correct incorrect information collected about them. For example, Adi Kamdar of the Electronic Foundation Frontier, an advocate for "individual rights in the digital world," states that, "Being able to edit one's information is critical-aggregated misinformation by companies like Acxiom has cost people jobs...Folks are often shocked by how mistaken some of the data is about them" (Kamdar, 2013) . More generally, Mason (1986) discusses the harm misinformation can cause individuals, stating that "Misinformation has a way of fouling up people's lives, especially when the party with the inaccurate information has an advantage in power and authority." Formally:
A DM has identity concerns if he has identity concerns for every type t ∈ T .
In what follows we provide applications of perception games where these various notions of privacy play a role.
Upper privacy and pooling behavior
Example 1 does not provide a full specification of BB's beliefs or Alice's utility function, which we now remedy: Suppose β I (ℓ) = 0.5, and that u(a, t, p) = χ {t=a} − 2|p − 0.5|, where p is the probability assigned to Alice being of type ℓ. Note that this utility function exhibits upper privacy concerns. How will the individual behave with such concerns?
Consider the pooling decision where both types of Alice take action R but believe that if action L is taken then BB will surely believe that Alice is of type ℓ. Note that following this strategy yields zero dis-utility due to perceptions. In addition, type r gets a utility of 1 whereas type ℓ gets a utility of 0. More importantly, neither of the types has an incentive to deviate and so this defines a perception equilibrium. Symmetrically, there exists another perception equilibrium, where action r and ℓ are reversed. 6
In fact, the pooling behavior in this concrete example is an instance of a broader phenomenon. Consider a DM with two types (T = {t ′ , t ′′ }) and two actions (A = {a ′ , a ′′ }).
Then the following holds:
Claim 1 If the player has upper privacy concerns and is not perception-neutral then there exists a perception equilibrium in which both types deterministically pool actions.
In general, a decision maker with upper privacy concerns may have high self-esteem and be almost indifferent to perceptions. In this case the perception equilibria can easily be derived as follows: Fix an arbitrary perception and compute the optimal decision profile for that perception while ignoring Bayesian consistency. Given the optimal action profile the set of all perception equilibria are all pairs consisting of such an action profile and an arbitrary perception that is Bayesian consistent with it.
However, Claim 1 touches on the case where privacy concerns do matter in some minimal meaningful way (where "meaningful" means enough to surpass the difference between utilities just from actions and invalidate perception-neutrality). The claim argues that in this case, there always exists a perception equilibrium in which nothing gets revealed to BB.
Proof of Claim 1:
The DM is not perception-neutral and so one of the types is not perception-neutral. Without loss of generality let t ′′ be that type.
Case 1 -type t ′ is perception-neutral: As t ′ is perception-neutral the same optimal action holds for any perception. Let us denote that action by a t ′ . As t ′′ is not perceptionneutral there exist some perception τ for which U (t ′′ , σ a t ′ , τ ) ≥ U (t ′′ , σ a , τ ), for a = a t ′ .
Furthermore, since the DM has upper privacy concerns, it must hold that U (t ′′ , σ a t ′ , τ t ′′ ) ≥ U (t ′′ , σ a t ′ , τ ), where τ t ′′ is the perception that satisfies τ t ′′ (a, v) = τ (a, v) and τ t ′′ (a t ′ , v) = of these types must choose between two actions, also denoted {0, 1}, which stand for evacuating or not evacuating Coventry. As with the discrete political activist, ignoring perception, the optimal action for type t is action t. In addition, UK does not want his opponent (which we may call Germany) to know which type he is. We assign a dis-utility of one to the case that the opponent knows for sure the type of the individual and a dis-utility of zero if the opponent learns nothing new about the individual beyond what he already knew before action was taken. UK's optimal action is, therefore, to choose action 1 (not evacuate) independent of her type. This story and the solution conforms with the story told by British WWII RAF officer, Captain F. W. Winterbotham, in his book The Ultra Secret (Winterbotham, 1974) .
where the inequality follows from the DM's upper privacy concerns. Thus, combining the
Consider now the strategy profile in which σ(t ′ ) = σ(t ′′ ) = a t ′ , and fix perception τ t ′′ of type t ′′ . That is, type t ′′ believes that if she deviates to a, the belief of BB will be as in τ .
However, under σ she plays a t ′′ and has perception β I (v) for each v, since both types are playing the same action. Thus, this is a perception equilibrium.
Case 2 -type t ′ is not perception-neutral: The proof of this case is quite is similar to the first case. As both types are not perception-neutral there must exist perceptions τ ′ , τ ′′
Since the player has upper privacy concerns it must hold that
Fixing σ(t ′ ) = σ(t ′′ ) = a ′ and perceptions τ t ′ and τ t ′′ of the respective types yields the desired perception equilibrium.
An alternative way to read Claim 1 is that privacy concerns can induce conformism in a society. It has long been asked how come so many people make an effort and vote in large elections when they are well aware that their vote will likely not be pivotal. Our observation suggests that, in the presence of some players who truly want to be good citizens, many others may be driven to vote due to perception concerns.
Claim 1 suggests the expected. If players exhibit (upper) privacy concerns then it is likely that types will pool. One thing to note is that although pooling is an equilibrium in the above model it is by no means the unique equilibrium, and non-pooling behavior is possible. To illustrate this note that for both types to read their optimal blog and thus fully reveal their type is another perception equilibrium in Example 1. Interestingly, this perception equilibrium demonstrates that privacy concerns need not imply pooling and therefore if one observes settings in which toes separate one may not conclude that players have no privacy concerns. This idea is explored further in Section 3.3.
Privacy and the common prior assumption
Claim 1 suggests that a type of DM can take an inferior action, but only if compensated by masking his type. In other words, privacy and material gain are substitutes. We now turn to show this in a more general setting than Example 1. Similarly to Example 1 a DM can be one of two types, T = {ℓ, r}, can take one of two actions, A = {L, R}, and has a utility function that depends on perception and on whether the chosen action matches the type but is independent of the type of BB:
is the probability assigned to the DM being of type ℓ and c : [0, 1] → R + is some continuous cost function. Suppose u is such that the DM has privacy concerns. Finally set β I (ℓ) = 0.5.
What we expect to see in such a perception game is that if a certain type takes an inferior action (with positive probability) then it must be true that the other type also takes that action (with positive probability). Indeed, this holds under the common prior assumption. Curiously, without the common prior assumption, this may no longer hold as we demonstrate in the sequel We now show that Claim 2 might not hold without the common prior assumption. in the next example there exists a perception equilibrium wherein the DM plays a separating equilibrium with each type deterministically taking his respective inferior action.
Note that this does not satisfy the common prior assumption-in particular, v ℓ ∈ supp(β A (ℓ)) even though ℓ ∈ supp(β I (v ℓ )). Finally, suppose that the DM's (upper) privacy concerns are relatively severe, and specifically that for type ℓ it holds that 1 − c(0) ≤ −c(0.5) and for type r it holds that 1 − c(1) ≤ −c(0.5).
In this perception game there is a separating equilibrium in which type ℓ plays R and type r plays L. The equilibrium is sustained by perceptions τ ℓ (v r , R) = τ r (v ℓ , L) = 0.5. To see why this is an equilibrium, consider type ℓ. He believes the type of BB is v r , type v r puts weight 1 on the type of DM being r, and type r plays action L in equilibrium. Thus, on a deviation to the superior action L he will be believed to be type r, which will yield him a utility of 1 − c(0). On the other hand, by sticking to his inferior, equilibrium action R he obtains utility −c(0.5). By assumption, the latter is preferred. A similar analysis holds for type r, and so this is an equilibrium.
3.3 Privacy, identity concern and the impossibility of pooling
The increasing prevalence of social and economic endeavors online has prompted some to declare that individuals no longer care about privacy. For example, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has defended a change in Facebook's privacy policy-switching the default option for the visibility of posts from private to public-by stating that "People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and different kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social norm is just something that has evolved over time" (see e.g. Kirkpatrick (2010) ). In other words, the observed activity in social network reflects, according to Zuckerberg, a change in social norms to a reduction in concerns for privacy.
Can this deduction be sustained by our theory? Claim 1 suggests this may be possible although Claim 1 itself is insufficient for doing so.
In the next example we take issue with this assessment and demonstrate that individuals with privacy concerns may nevertheless rationally act as if they have no such concernsin fact, in our example they do so in the unique equilibrium. Thus, by merely observing actions it may be impossible to separate between those who do and those who do not have (upper) privacy concerns.
To motivate our example consider the following scenario. An individual who is a member of a social network has just returned from her vacation, which was either Athens (denoted a)
or Berlin (denoted b). The individual is expected to post her destination but may choose not to be truthful. In this context the above quote from Zuckerberg suggests that if individuals do post their true destinations then one must conclude they have no privacy concerns and hence privacy is over-accentuated.
However, as we shall show, this is not necessarily the case. We will introduce types that do have privacy concerns as well as those who do not. We will then argue that it may the case that those who traveled to Athens (Berlin) will post Athens (Berlin) as their destination independently of whether or not they have privacy concerns.
Formally, a DM has four types T = {t n,a , t n,b , t p,a , t p,b }. There are two actions A = {a, b} and a single type of BB, V = {v}. The subscripts of the types denote whether or not they have privacy concerns (p or n) and what is their true destination (a or b).
The utility functions exhibit the following:
• For every x ∈ {n, p}, µ ∈ ∆(T ), and v ∈ V u(t x,a , v, a, µ) > u(t x,a , v, b, µ) and
, v, a, µ). In words, fixing the perception, the DM prefers truthfulness.
• Types t n,a and t n,b are perception-neutral.
• Types t p,a and t p,b have upper privacy concerns. • Types t p,a and t p,b have identity concerns. 8
The beliefs of the DM satisfy:
• β(v)(t p,a ) = αε, 7 Note that this does not limit the level of paranoia about privacy -in particular, it is possible that type tp,a, who prefers a when the perception is fixed, reverses this preference under some different perception µ ′ :
u(tp,a, v, b, µ) ≫ u(tp,a, v, a, µ ′ ). • β(v)(t p,b ) = (1 − α)ε,
• β(v)(t n,a ) = α(1 − ε), and
Claim 3 The strategies σ(t p,a ) = σ(t n,a ) = a and σ(t p,b ) = σ(t n,b ) = b and the corresponding perceptions form the unique perception equilibrium.
Proof: Consider some action profile σ in which the perception-neutral types play optimally, namely σ(t n,a ) = a and σ(t n,b ) = b. The belief of type v after observing action a is:
.
where µ(t p,a ∪ t n,a ) = 1 and µ ′ (t p,b ∪ t n,b ) = 1. Since u(t p,a , v, a, µ) > u(t p,b , v, b, µ ′ ), when ε is small enough type t p,a will optimally choose to play σ(t p,a ) = a. A similar argument shows that type t p,b will optimally choose to play σ(t p,b ) = b.
Lower privacy concerns and anonymous donations
In many economic models the act of donation is explained as a conspicuous expense designed to signal to society about the donor's wealth, status and possible charitable personae (see for example Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) . If so, why is the possibility of anonymous donation institutionalized in various societies (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004) ?
One could argue that potential donors are altruists who enjoy the act of giving while maintaining privacy (e.g., due to concerns of others knocking on their doors for money), which are enough to deter them from giving in the absence of anonymous donations. However, if one expects both modes of behavior-charitable acts of donors with privacy concerns alongside selfish donations-then the latter types may not contribute at all as they would be singled out from the "true" charitable types.
This puzzle is also considered by Hugh-Jones and Reinstein (2012), who propose a signaling game where individuals are asked to contribute to a public good. They consider 2 types of players, the "good" types who are conditionally cooperative and benefit by contributing only if others of their type also do, and "bad" types who are non-cooperative.
In the non-anonymous setting non-contributors can be excluded from the public good and so bad types want to mimic the good types if those contribute. Consequently the good types have less incentive to contribute. In the anonymous case the willingness to contribute among the bad types is driven out and and so the good types end up contributing more.
Indirectly the issue of being excluded from the public good can be thought of as a privacy concern, where privacy concerns in a stage game are actually the consequence of standard utility considerations in the future game.
We propose an alternative explanation by directly resorting to privacy considerations.
We do so by comparing two variants of the donations game-one that allows for anonymous donations and one that does not. We show in this example that, in the presence of a type who has weak privacy concerns, anonymity actually allows for more donations. Whereas in the model of Hugh-Jones and Reinstein (2012) an anonymous donations institution implies that non-anonymous donations are impossible, this is not the case in our set-up where both options co-exist (although not both are actually used in equilibrium).
Consider a DM with two types (T = {t, n}), where type t is an "altruist" and type n is "not an altruist" and let V = {v} be a singleton. Consider first a single player perception game in which the actions are A = {g, g ′ , h}, where g signifies "give charity" and h signifies "don't give charity" (g ′ is discussed below). For the altruist, preferences are such that he prefers to give charity and be identified as an altruist than to not give charity and be identified as a non-altruist. For the non-altruist, preferences are such that he prefers to not give charity but be identified as an altruist than to give charity and be identified as a non-altruist. Formally, let µ ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that BB believes the player is of type t. The utility functions satisfy
• u(t, v, g, µ) > u(t, v, h, µ) for every µ;
• u(t, v, g, µ) > u(t, v, g, µ ′ ) whenever µ > µ ′ ;
• u(n, v, h, µ) > u(n, v, g, µ) for every µ;
• u(n, v, h, µ) > u(n, v, h, µ ′ ) whenever µ > µ ′ ;
The third action, g ′ , allows for the possibility of anonymous charity -that is, charity that is not observed. To model the anonymity, intuitively think of action g ′ as being observationally equivalent to action h. This is formally defined in Appendix B, which extends the model of perception games to include observations of partitions of the action space. 9 That is, instead of observing the action of the active player, the inactive player observes the element of the partition to which the active player's action belongs. In our example, the actions g ′ and h belong to the same partition element, and the inactive player only observes that one of g ′ or h was played (but not which). He does observe g if it is played. Observe that this implies that the inference of the inactive player on action g ′ is identical to his inference on action h.
Suppose the utility functions satisfy:
• u(t, v, g ′ , µ) ≥ u(t, v, g, µ) for all µ;
• u(n, v, g ′ , µ) < u(n, v, h, µ) for all µ.
That is, all else being equal, the altruist prefers to give anonymously than to give publicly, whereas the non-altruist prefers to not give than to give anonymously.
In this game, there will always be some charity given:
Claim 4 In every perception equilibrium of the above perception game, the altruist gives charity (either g or g ′ ).
Proof: Fix a perception equilibrium (σ, τ ), and suppose towards a contradiction that h ∈ supp(σ(t)). Now, by assumption u(t, v, g ′ , µ) > u (t, v, g, µ) and u(t, v, g, µ) > u (t, v, h, µ) for every µ. Furthermore, the perception τ on observing g ′ (or h, since they are in the same partition) remains unchanged when a player switches between h and g ′ . But u(t, v, g ′ , τ ) > u(t, v, g, τ ) > u (t, v, h, τ ) , and so the altruist will never play action h.
Now suppose that it is no longer possible to give charity anonymously. Formally, delete the action g ′ from the game above. How does this affect the amount of charity given?
Denote by β the ex ante probability that the inactive player v assigns to the active player being an altruist. Then under some setting of the parameters, it may be possible for both types to give charity in a perception equilibrium:
Claim 5 If u(n, v, g, β) > u(n, v, h, 0), then there is a perception equilibrium in which σ t = σ n = g and τ (h) = 0.
Proof: The non-altruist obtains u (n, v, g, β) , which, by assumption, is higher than the u(n, v, h, 0) he would obtain by deviating. The altruist obtains u (t, v, g, β) , and a deviation will yield him u(t, v, h, 0). From our assumptions, u(t, v, g, β) > u(t, v, g, 0) > u(t, v, h, 0), so he will not benefit from deviating either.
In this case, allowing for the possibility of anonymous charity increases the amount of charity given. However, this is not always the case. In particular, the possibility of anonymous charity may also be harmful: v, g, 0) , then there is a perception equilibrium in which σ t = σ n = h and τ (g) = 0.
Proof:
The altruist obtains u (t, v, h, β) , which, by assumption, is higher than the u(t, v, g, 0) he would obtain by deviating. The non-altruist obtains u(n, v, h, β), and a deviation will yield him u(n, v, g, 0). From our assumptions, u(n, v, h, β) > u(n, v, h, 0) > u(t, v, g, 0), so he will not benefit from deviating either.
Removing the possibility of anonymous charity might lead to a perception equilibrium in which neither the altruist nor the non-altruist give charity, and so the amount of charity given decreases.
In summary, without the possibility for anonymous donation, it could be that neither type gives charity, but it could also be that both give charity. With the possibility of anonymous donation, it is always the case that at least one of the types gives charity. Thus, allowing for anonymous donation can both increase and decrease the expected number of donations. From a worst-case perspective this implies that the scheme that allows anonymous donations is superior.
Other Applications
In this section we demonstrate that perception games are well suited for modeling settings where perception matters beyond the context of privacy.
The Bravery game
We begin with an example that is inspired by the Bravery game, a psychological game due to Geanakoplos et al. (1989) . In this game there is a player who must make a decision, but is concerned about the opinion of others about him. In particular, the player can take a timid or bold action. In the words of Geanakoplos et al. (1989) , "His payoff depends not only on what he does but also on what he thinks his friends think of his character," and so the player "would prefer to be timid rather than bold, unless he thinks that his friends expect him to be bold, in which case he prefers not to disappoint them." Geanakoplos et al. (1989) proceed to analyze a psychological game based on this story, and show that the player is "best off when his friends expect little, but if their expectations are high he is trapped into meeting them."
Now, while this is originally modeled as a psychological game, the language of Geanakoplos et al.
(1989) makes it seem like the player should care about his friends' opinion of his type, i.e. his character. This is not how Geanakoplos et al. (1989) model the game-instead, in their game the payoff is based on the player's actions and his (mixed) strategy. Thus, the following perception game seems to capture better the story told by Geanakoplos et al. (1989) . 10
The active player is either of type t (timid) or type b (bold). The player can either take action T (Timid action) or B (Bold action). Let the utility function be such that type t always prefers to take action T . Type b's utility function corresponds to the utility function in Geanakoplos et al. (1989) : In particular,
where µ ∈ ∆({B, T }) is the probability the player assigns to BB's posterior belief that the player is of type b. 11 Then this game has the feature, as in Geanakoplos et al. (1989) , that the (bold) player would prefer to play the Timid action, unless he is believed to be of type b, in which case he prefers the Bold action.
What is the perception equilibrium of this game? Since type t always plays T , if the support of σ(b) includes action B then τ b (B) = 1, yielding a payoff of u(b, B, 1) = 1. Note that he cannot play B with probability 1 in an optimal decision profile, since then τ b (T ) = 0 and a deviation will be profitable. The perception equilibria are thus the following, where β(b) is the probability the player assigns to BB's prior belief that the player is of type b: 2. Perception equilibria with pure actions: Type b plays T with probability one. To sustain this optimal decision profile his perception must satisfy:
Note that similarly to the conclusions of Geanakoplos et al. (1989) , whenever a bold player assumes BB has low expectations of him (β(b) < 2 3 ) then he surely takes the timid action, T , which results in a utility of u(b, T, β) = 3(1 − β) > 1 . If the bold player assumes BB has high expectations of him (β(b) ≥ 2 3 ) then he may need to take bold action, B, every so often and hence his utility will be u(b, B, 1) = 2 − 1 = 1 . In particular, the player of type b is better off when there are lower expectations of him being bold.
Everyone wants to be a hero
In many economic, political, and social interactions, the possible types of participants can be divided into "good" types and "bad" types: Workers can be skilled or unskilled, politicians can be honest or dishonest, and individuals can be altruistic or selfish, courageous or fainthearted, generous or frugal, etc.. In these examples, and many others, all individuals would like to be perceived as the "good" types, to the extent that they may forego some material benefits in order to be perceived as such. Additionally, in many of these settings actions can also be divided into "easy" and "hard" actions: high vs. low effort in a labor setting, donate vs. not donate, brave vs. timid, etc.. Keeping perceptions fixed, all types prefer to take the easy action.
One might expect "bad" types to either pool with "good" types, so as to benefit from this perception (on either the easy or hard action), or, if separation occurs, then it must be that high types are more likely to take the hard action. In this section we show that this expectation is indeed true in the simplest setting in which there are exactly two types of participants. However, in an ever slightly more complex setting the situation is not quite as simple. We show that when there are three, rather than two, types, whether or not behavior conforms with this expectation largely depends on the beliefs held by participants, and in particular whether or not the common prior and independent types assumptions hold.
We frame our analysis in the context of a worker who can be skilled or unskilled. Consider a decision maker who must complete one of two tasks, A = {a h , a e }. a h is the more challenging (harder) task. Initially we consider a DM who can be one of two types, T ′ = {t s , t u }: the first is a skilled type, and the second is an unskilled type. There is also a BB who is one of a set of types V . The DM cares about which task he completes, as well as whether or not he is perceived by the BB as being the skilled type. However he does not care about the type of the BB-namely, for all t ∈ T , a ∈ A, any pair v, v ′ ∈ V , and perception µ ∈ [0, 1] (which denotes the probability the BB assigns to the DM being type t s ):
Thus, we may henceforth omit the dependence on v in the utility function.
We refer to action a e as the easy action as for any fixed perception all types prefer this task: ∀t ∈ T and perception µ, u(t, a e , µ) > u(t, a h , µ).
In what sense is one type skilled while the other is unskilled? This manifests itself in two ways. First, players prefer being perceived as the skilled type: For any type t ∈ T , any action a ∈ A and any pair of perceptions µ > µ ′ : u(t, a, µ) > u(t, a, µ ′ ).
Second, skilled players have less aversion for the hard task. This is modeled via the marginal perception gain required to move a worker from the easy to the hard task: Let µ t ∈ (0, 1) be defined as type t's threshold perception for indifference between taking the hard action and being perceived as skilled, versus taking the easy action and being perceived as only possibly skilled (with probability µ t ). Formally, u(t, a h , 1) > u(t, a e , µ) ⇐⇒ µ < µ t . We assume that µ ts > µ tu , that is, the unskilled type has a lower threshold (which we view as requiring more effort in undertaking task a h .) Indeed, in this very stylized model, with only two types of DM, the intuition that skilled workers are more likely to take the harder action holds:
Claim 7 In every perception equilibrium σ(t s )(a h ) ≥ σ(t u )(a h ).
Proof: Suppose towards a contradiction that there is a perception equilibrium in which σ(t s )(a h ) < σ(t u )(a h ). We will show that in this case, for every v ∈ V it holds that τ tu (v, a e ) ≥ τ tu (v, a h ). This will imply a contradiction, since then the easier action dominates the harder action in both material and perception payoffs, and so type t u will never play the harder action in equilibrium.
Fix some v ∈ V , and, for ease of notation, denote by β def = β I (v, t s ). There are three cases to consider:
1. β ∈ (0, 1): The perceptions of v on actions a h and a e can be derived by Bayes' rule, and satisfy
, which holds if and only if σ(t s )(a h ) < σ(t u )(a h ).
2. β = 0: Since σ(t s )(a h ) < σ(t u )(a h ), it must be the case that σ(t u )(a h ) > 0, and so τ tu (v, a h ) = 0. Thus, since τ tu (v, a e ) ≥ 0, it follows that τ tu (v, a e ) ≥ τ tu (v, a h ).
3. β = 1: Since σ(t s )(a h ) < σ(t u )(a h ), it must be the case that σ(t s )(a e ) > 0, and so τ tu (v, a e ) = 1. Thus, since τ tu (v, a h ) ≤ 1, it follows that τ tu (v, a e ) ≥ τ tu (v, a h ).
How robust is our conclusion? What happens when we introduce one more type, say of an unskilled worker? We show that our expectation on behavior is not always correct, but rather depends on the DM's beliefs.
Hereinafter throughout Section 4.2 we assume that the DM is one of three types, T = {t s , t u , t ′ u }, where the first two are as in T ′ (the binary case) and the last is also an unskilled type who may differ from t u in his beliefs. Unfortunately, the conclusion from the two type cases no longer holds:
Example 4 Type v of BB believes all three types of DM are equally likely, and type v ′ of BB believes that the DM is of type t ′ u with probability 1. Types t s and t ′ u of DM believe that BB is of type v with probability 1, and type t u of DM believes that BB is of type v ′ with probability
We claim that in Example 4 there is an equilibrium in which the skilled type t s takes the easier action a e , whereas the unskilled type t u takes the more challenging action a h . In this equilibrium, type t ′ u also takes action a e . This equilibrium is sustained by the perception τ tu (v ′ , a h ) = 1. That is, on taking the (equilibrium) action a h , type t u believes he is perceived by the BB (of type v ′ ) as being skilled with probability 1. This is an equilibrium because, on a deviation to the easier action a e , type t u will be perceived as unskilled (of type t ′ u ) with probability 1. Nevertheless, if we assume that there exists a common prior then a weaker version of our conclusion holds:
Claim 8 If beliefs satisfy the common prior assumption, then in every perception equilibrium it holds that σ(t s )(a h ) = 0 =⇒ σ(t u )(a h ) = σ(t ′ u )(a h ) = 0.
In words, as per the intuition expressed in the beginning of Section 4.2, it cannot be the case that an unskilled type is willing to undertake the harder task while the skilled type is not, as this will unequivocally reveal that the player is unskilled.
Proof:
Suppose towards a contradiction that σ(t u )(a h ) > 0 but σ(t s )(a h ) = 0. Let
)} be the types of BB that t u believes are possible. Then for every v ∈ V u it must hold that τ tu (v, a h ) = 0. To see this, observe first that by the common prior assumption, v ∈ V u implies that t u ∈ supp(β I (v)). Now, if it also holds that t s ∈ supp(β I (v)) then the perception τ tu (v, a h ) = 0 follows from Bayes' rule and the facts that σ(t s )(a h ) = 0 and σ(t u )(a h ) > 0. Otherwise, the perception follows from Bayes' rule and the facts that the support of β I (v) only contains unskilled types and σ(t u )(a h ) > 0. Now, a deviation to a e will lead to some perception µ ∈ [0, 1]. But note that u(t u , a e , µ) ≥ u(t u , a e , 0) > u(t u , a h , 0), and so a deviation to a e is strictly profitable. This contradicts the existence of a perception equilibrium with σ(t u )(a h ) > 0 and σ(t s )(a h ) = 0.
While Claim 8 shows that an unskilled type will not undertake the harder action if the skilled type does not, the claim does not guarantee that the skilled type will take the harder action with higher probability than the unskilled type, as was the case in the two type setting. Does the common prior assumption suffice to guarantee this stronger conclusion?
We will show by example that this need not hold. The example places particular structure on the utility functions:
Definition 11 LetÛ = {u(t, v, a, µ) = µ − c t · 1 a=a h |µ ∈ [0, 1], c t > 0} (where µ is the probability that BB of type v assigns to the DM being of type t s ).
For any utility function inÛ the DM obtains a positive utility equal to this perception probability, but a type-specific cost when the action taken is the more challenging a h .
Example 5 Fix c ts = 1/4 and c tu = c t ′ u = 3/11, and note that c ts < c tu = c t ′ u . Also, let beliefs be such that
The following is a perception equilibrium for Example 5 in which σ(t s )(a h ) = 0.8 < 1 = σ(t u )(a h ), and σ(t ′ u )(a h ) = 0. In particular note that σ(t u )(a h ) > σ(t s )(a h ).
To see that this is an equilibrium, first observe that under this strategy profile the perceptions τ v (a h ) = 4/9, τ v (a e ) = 1/6, τ v ′ (a h ) = 8/9, and τ v ′ (a e ) = 2/3. Thus, τ v (a h ) − τ v (a e ) = 5/18 and τ v ′ (a h ) − τ v ′ (a e ) = 2/9. In this equilibrium, all types will be indifferent between actions a h and a e . For the skilled type this requires 1 2 · 5 18 + 1 2 · 2 9 = c ts = 1 4 , and for the unskilled types this requires 10 11 · 5 18 + 1 11 · 2 9 = c tu = 3 11 .
These both hold.
Observe that in Example 5 the beliefs do satisfy the common prior assumption, and yet there is no monotonicity in the probabilities of taking the harder action. We now show that if beliefs additionally satisfy the independent types assumption, then, at least under a particular form of utility function, the stronger conclusion can be obtained.
Claim 9 Assume a player utility function is inÛ and furthermore that c ts < c tu and c ts < c t ′ u . 12 If beliefs satisfy the independent types assumption, then in every perception equilibrium
Proof: Suppose towards a contradiction that σ(t s )(a h ) < σ(t u )(a h ) (the case of σ(t s )(a h ) < σ(t ′ u )(a h ) is symmetric to this). The expected utility of type t is
where we slightly abuse notation so that τ t (v, a) denotes the probability which the DM of type t believes that type v assigns to the DM being of type t s when the action played is a.
Since σ(t s )(a h ) < σ(t u )(a h ) by assumption, type t s cannot play action a h with probability 1, and so in equilibrium he must weakly prefer action a e . This implies that
The skilled type incurs a lower cost to taking the harder action than the unskilled types.
which holds if and only if v∈V β A (t s )(v) · (τ ts (v, a h ) − τ ts (v, a e )) ≤ c ts .
(1)
In order for type t u to also play action a h with positive probability, it must hold that
which holds if and only if v∈V
Finally, observe that because of the independent types assumption it holds that τ ts (w, a) = τ tu (w, a) for every w ∈ V and a ∈ A. Furthermore, by that same assumption it holds that
Plugging these into (1) and (2), and using the fact that c ts < c tu , yields a contradiction.
Perception and mechanism design
In this section we provide an ad-hoc glimpse into the potential of perceptions in mechanism design. This ad-hoc example is within the realm of Section 4.2, with two types and two actions. We show how different yet very similar initial perceptions can lead to different outcomes.
The point of view we take here is that of the firm who would like to ensure that the worker takes on the harder of the two actions, independently of his type. Consider first the case with only one type of BB (which can be thought of as the employing firm) who believes both types t ∈ T = {t s , t u } are equally likely. Suppose also that utilities are as in Section 4.2, and such that µ tu < 1/2. It is easy to verify that in this setting there is no pooling equilibrium in which both players take the harder action.
Now consider a case where the firm may, in the eyes of the employee, have two types (two types of BB in the jargon of perception games), v and v ′ . Both types of the DM see these two types as equally likely. However, the beliefs of the two types of BB are polarized:
v assigns probability 1 − ε to t s , and probability ε to t u , whereas v ′ assigns probability ε to t s and probability 1− ε to t u . 13 Note, however, that BB's average belief exactly corresponds to the beliefs in the first case with one BB (50:50).
In this setting there may be a pooling equilibrium with both players playing the harder action a h . The perception of both BBs on action a e is 0 (certainty that the player is unskilled). In order for this to be an equilibrium, we need:
for both t = t s and t = t u . For type t s this is always true for large enough ε < 1/2. For type t u this is sometimes true (depending on the utility function -see Example 6 below).
A lesson from the firm's perspective (which is suggestive of a mechanism design approach) is that if workers are ambiguous about how they are initially perceived (they don't know if they are viewed as v or as v ′ views them), all workers can be compelled to both take the harder action, which may not be possible without such ambiguity. The question of how the firm might introduce such ambiguity is beyond the scope of our discussion.
The following is a specific example in which such ambiguity is beneficial:
Example 6 Assume action a e is costless for both types. Taking action a h has cost 1/20
for the skilled type, and cost 5/16 for the unskilled type. The utilities of both players are p 2 − cost(action), where p is the probability that they are perceived as skilled. Finally, the ε in the description above is ε = 1/4.
Multiplicity of equilibria and refinements
In many single player perception games, such as Example 3.1, there are multiple perception equilibria. This is not too troubling as such multiplicity may appear in standard decision problems without perceptions. Nevertheless, it motivates an inquiry into possible equilibrium refinements.
Applying the Intuitive Criterion
One such refinement is suggested below and is based on the Intuitive Criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) in the context of signaling games. This refinement restricts perceptions of the DM on actions for which BB assigns probability zero.
Let (σ, τ ) be a perception equilibrium of some single player perception game (T, V, A, u, β) and let T ′ ⊂ T . LetT (T ′ ) be the set of all perceptions,τ , of the form:
is the set of beliefs with support in T ′ .
Definition 12 A perception equilibrium (σ, τ ) in a perception game (T, V, A, u, β) is called Intuitive if for any v ′ ∈ V and a ′ ∈ A v ′ σ the following holds. If there exists some subset of types T ′ ⊂ T such that:
1. Any type t ∈ T ′ is unhappy from deviating to action a ′ , no matter what is BB's belief.
Formally, ∀t ∈ T ′ , ∀τ ∈ ∆(T ) U (t, a ′ , τ ) ≤ U (t, σ t , τ ); and 2. Any type t ′ ∈ T ′ profits from deviating to action a ′ subject to the assumption that BB of type v, conditional on observing action a ′ , is certain that DM is of some type in
3. At least one of the inequalities above is strict.
Then: Any type t ′ ∈ T ′ of the DM assumes BB, upon observing actions that have zero probability, must be some type t ′′ ∈ T ′ . Formally, τ ∈T (T ′ ).
Example 7 A young DM may have one of three types that correspond to her political opinions. We denote these three types by T = {l, c, r} corresponding to left wing, central and right wing views. The DM may follow one of three political blogs denoted A = {L, C.R}.
Without perceptions the DM would like to follow the blog corresponding to her type (utility of one) and is indifferent between the other two (zero utility). With perceptions the following is assumed. All three would like to be identified as left winged (this gives them a utility of 1). 14 In addition l prefers being identified as c (dis-utility of zero) over r (dis-utility of one), r prefers being identified as r (dis-utility of zero) over c (dis-utility of one) and c is indifferent between r over c (dis-utility of one). 15 The following is a perception equilibrium:
All three types follow blog L. In addition, all three types believe that upon following blogs C or R they will be identified as c. However, this is not an Intuitive equilibrium. To see this consider the possibility of r playing R and believing this will induce everyone to think he is of type r. This implies a better payoff for r than the optimal decision profile payoff.
However, for players l and c there is no reason to change to R no matter what anyone would think of them.
Example 8 (The Bravery game revisited): Note that some of the pure optimal decision profiles in the example, in particular those of items 2(a) and 2(b) that satisfy τ b (B) < 1, are not Intuitive. However, observe that for every β(b) there is at least one Intuitive optimal 14 This young DM conforms to Churchill's observation that "If you're not a liberal at twenty you have no heart, if you're not a conservative at forty you have no brain."
15 To fully specify u the dis-utility from perceptions should be extended linearly over all beliefs.
decision profile: For β(b) ≥ 2/3 it is the mixed optimal decision profile, and otherwise it is the optimal decision profile corresponding to τ b (B) = 1.
Example 9 (Upper privacy and pooling behavior revisited): The equilibrium in Claim 1 is not necessarily Intuitive. It can be made Intuitive with the additional assumption that the player also has lower privacy concerns.
Example 10 (Anonymous donations revisited): The equilibria of Claims 4, 5, and 6 are Intuitive. This follows from the fact that for both types, there is a belief µ for which they play action g, and a belief µ ′ for which they play an action from {h, g ′ }.
Deletion of dominated equilibria
The analysis of Nash equilibria of a standard game suggests that we ignore action profiles where for some player there is a profitable deviation, even when the deviation yields another profile which itself is ruled out by the Nash equilibrium paradigm. What happens if we apply a similar logic here? Let (σ, τ ) and (σ,τ ) be two consistent strategies for a player in a single player perception game (T, V, A, u, β). We say that (σ,τ ) dominates (σ, τ ) if
for all t ∈ T , with at least one strict inequality. We say that (σ, τ )
is dominated if there exists some consistent (σ,τ ) that dominates it.
A strongly undominated perception equilibrium is a perception equilibrium that is not dominated. A weaker version is that of a weakly undominated perception equilibrium which is a perception equilibrium for which there is no other perception equilibrium that dominates it. Clearly, any strongly undominated perception equilibrium is also a weakly undominated perception equilibrium.
Example 11 Consider the following perception equilibrium in the Example 1, where type ℓ reads blog L and type r reads blog R, thus fully revealing one's type. In this equilibrium both types receive a utility of zero and hence this is not a weakly undominated perception equilibrium (and obviously not a strongly undominated perception equilibrium).
General Perception Games
In this section we propose to extend the single DM model to a game involving more than one active player. For simplicity of exposition we consider only two-player games and comment on the extension to N -player games. A 2-player perception game is a tuple (
defined as follows. For each player i:
• T i is a finite type space.
• A i is a finite action space.
This model departs from a traditional 2-player game with incomplete information in a way similar to our single DM model: The utility of the players not only depends on their own types and the joint vector of actions but also on what the player assumes her opponent knows about her own type. In addition, our model is subjective and does not assume a prior (and definitely not a common prior) over the type sets.
Similarly to the single player perception game a strategy for player i is a function σ i :
Given a tuple (β i , τ i ) 2 i=1 the expected payoff to player i, at a given type t i when players use strategies (
when the beliefs and perceptions are clear), computed as follows:
Let us consider the perceptions of player i were she aware of the beliefs of player −i.
be the probability that i, of type t i , assigns to −i being of type t −i and to this type taking the action b . Thus,
is the probability she assigns to −i taking the action b and P t i (t −i |b) =
is interpreted as 0) is the conditional probability that i, of type t i , assigns to −i being of type t −i upon seeing the action b of −i. Symmetrically, let P t −i (t i |a) be the conditional probability that −i, of type t −i , assigns to i being of typet i upon seeing the action a of i.
such that both players are consistent and for any i and t i ∈ T i , the strategy σ i is a best reply:
As with the single player perception game we assume continuity in the last argument of the utility function:
Assumption 2 For each i, the utility function u i :
Proposition 2 Under assumption 2 a perception equilibrium exists in every perception game.
The proof that the best-reply correspondence of each player is upper-hemicontinuous is essentially the same as that for the single DM. Once this is established the existence of equilibrium follows. Thus, we leave out the details of the proof.
In an N -player perception game the utility function of agent i is of the form u i :
where ∆(T i ) N −1 captures the perception player i has over the belief of each of the other agents over his type. Beliefs, perceptions, strategies and equilibrium are defined as natural extension of the two player case where perceptions are elements of ∆(T i ) N −1 (for the 2 player case this folds back to ∆(T i )). The corresponding continuity assumption guarantees the existence of a perception equilibrium.
Prying
One might argue that whenever a player is concerned with what opponents learn about him from observing his action then, symmetrically, he should also be concerned with what he learn about opponents. To capture this one would require the utility function to be of the Suppose that the utility a player obtains from such prying is "independent" of his privacy concern and action. Formally, suppose the utility function is separable, namely that there
where v i is as in perception games and w i is the utility obtained from what is learned about the other players, and such that
Then it is straightforward to show that a perception equilibrium exists in this setting as well.
This follows from the observation that if w i ≡ 0, then an equilibrium exists by Proposition 2.
This profile is then an equilibrium also for every w i ≡ 0, since a deviation does not change what a player learns about the other.
Perceptions and efficiency
Consider a DM with an additively-separable utility function of the form u(t, v, a, q) = v(t, v, a) − w(t, v, q), where the privacy component, v, is always positive. With such utility functions we can compare the predicted optimal decision profile when perceptions matter to those predicted when perceptions do not matter (w is always zero). Clearly, in a single player perception game the addition of dis-utility due to perception will not increase welfare and will typically decrease it. This intuitive and trivial observation fails when more than a single DM are involved. Suppose also that player 1's (the row player) type is u or d with probability 0.5, and player 2's (the column player) type is ℓ or r independently with probability 0.5. In the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game, player 1 of type u plays U and player 1 of type d plays D, whereas player 2 of type ℓ plays L and player 2 of type r plays R. This yields the following interim expected utilities: type: u d ℓ r utility: 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Consider now the privacy game G = (T, A, u, β), which is based on the Bayesian game of Figure 1 as follows: The type space T and action space A are the same as in the Bayesian game, and the beliefs β also correspond to the same commonly known prior of 0.5 for each type. For each player i, the utility function is u i (t 1 , t 2 , a 1 , a 2 , µ i ) = v i (t 1 , t 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) − w(µ i ),
where v(t 1 , t 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) is the utility of player i in the Bayesian game of Figure 1 and w(µ i ) is a privacy cost that depends only on the belief µ i of player −i about i's type (and denotes the probability that player −i believes i is of type ℓ or u). Specifically, fix w(µ i ) ≥ 0 for all µ i ∈ [0, 1], with w(0.5) = 0 and w(0) = w(1) = 1 + ε for some ε > 0. This corresponds to no privacy cost when the posterior belief is 0.5, identical to the prior, and a nonnegative cost otherwise. Now consider the strategy profile σ in which σ 1 (u) = σ 1 (d) = U and σ 2 (ℓ) = σ 2 (r) = L.
Also, fix the perception τ as τ 1 (U ) = τ 2 (L) = 0.5 and τ 1 (D) = τ 2 (R) = 0. That is, the first pair of equalities are derived by consistency, whereas the latter equalities state that upon a deviation, the other player believes that the deviator is of type R or D.
We claim that (σ, τ ) is a perception equilibrium. To see this, consider for example player 1. Her expected utility under σ is 5 under type u and 3 under type d. Type u clearly has no incentive to deviate. As for type d, a deviation will lead to a higher v payoff of 4. However, there will now be a privacy cost of 1 + ε, since the belief of player 2 at a deviation will be 0. Thus, the total utility will be 4 − 1 − ε < 3, and so such a deviation is not profitable. A similar argument holds for player 2.
Finally, observe that the equilibrium (σ, τ ) yields the following interim expected utilities: type: u d ℓ r utility: 5 3 5 3
Thus, even though the game G consisted only of adding privacy costs to the Bayesian game of Figure 1 , the resulting equilibrium yields a strictly higher welfare to both types of both players.
Concluding Remarks
Privacy concerns of individuals often depend on what they expect others to learn from their own actions. Thinking about privacy as the interplay between who I really am and what others know (or rather, believe) about me generates the following circle of reasoning: Based on who I am I will choose my action, which will then induce others to have a belief about who I am, which may then compel me to take a different action. A perception game captures this circular reasoning and uses a fixed-point-a perception equilibrium-to predict an outcome in such a setting. Such equilibria, similar to equilibria in signaling games, induce a full spectrum of privacy related outcomes. At the extremes, they may be completely pooling and hence others learn nothing about me and my privacy is kept intact, or they can be fully separating, in which case privacy is completely jeopardized.
Perception games provide a framework for the formal analysis of strategic settings in which actions and perceptions both play a role. Thus, they provide a unified framework for studying interactions among strategic players who care about the way others perceive them, which goes well beyond privacy concerns. In particular, perception games generalize models that have been used in the literature on social image and conspicuous consumption.
We have formulated the natural analogs of Bayesian equilibria and discussed existence as well as some refinements. We also demonstrated the usefulness of perception games through a series of examples.
In this paper we restricted attention to a relatively simple class of perception games where players' utilities depend on perceptions of their types, but do not take perceptions over perceptions into account (in contrast with psychological games, where utilities may depend on a full hierarchy of beliefs). We also limited ourselves to a static, one-shot setting.
We hope to study extensions to these restrictions in future work.
B Model with partition signals
A perception game with partitions is a tuple (T, V, A, u, β, Π), where the first five arguments are as in a perception game, and Π is a partition of A. For an action a ∈ A, denote by Π(a) the element π of the partition to which a belongs. Also denote by Π(·) the set of all partition elements.
In this model, strategies are also defined as in perception games, but here a perception for type t of the active player is a function τ t : V × Π(·) → ∆(T ), which represents what an active player of type t believes the inactive player's belief (of some type v) is over the active player's own type, when the inactive player observes not the action played, but rather the element of the partition to which this action belongs. The expected payoff of the active player at type t, given the perception τ t and the strategy σ t ∈ ∆(A) is:
a∈A,v∈V σ t (a) · β A (t)(v) · u(t, v, a, τ t (v, Π(a))).
As with perception games, we will require the active player's perceptions τ to be consistent. Let σ t (Π(a)) = a ′ ∈Π(a) σ t (a) be the probability the active player plays an action in Π(a), and let P v (t, Π(a)|σ) = β I (v)(t) · σ t (Π(a)) be the probability that the inactive player assigns to the active player being of type t and taking an action in Π(a), conditional on her playing the strategy profile σ. Then P v (Π(a)|σ) = t∈T P v (t, Π(a)|σ) is the probability she assigns to the active player taking action a. Recall that A v σ = {∪t ∈supp(β I (v)) supp(σ(t))}. Let P v (t|Π(a), σ) = Pv(t,Π(a)|σ) Pv(Π(a)|σ) be the conditional probability that the inactive player of type v assigns to the active player being of type t upon seeing an element Π(a) of the partition, and note that this is well defined for all Π(a) such that a ′ ∈ A v σ for some a ′ ∈ Π(a).
Definition 14 A strategy-perception pair (σ, τ ) is consistent under Π if τ t (v, Π(a)) (t) = P v (t|Π(a), σ) for all t,t ∈ T , v ∈ V and a ∈ Π(a ′ ) for some a ′ ∈ A v σ .
Definition 15 A (subjective) perception equilibrium under partition Π is a strategy-perception pair (σ, τ ) that is consistent under Π and such that σ is a best-reply profile: For every t ∈ T it holds that U (t, σ t , τ t ) ≥ U (t,σ, τ t ) for allσ ∈ ∆(A).
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1 a perception equilibrium under partition Π exists in any perception game with partitions (T, V, A, u, β, Π).
Proof: Given a perception game with partitions (T, V, A, u, β, Π), construct a perception game (without partitions) (T, V, A ′ , u ′ , β), where the set of actions A ′ def = Π(·) -that is, the new set of actions is the set of partition elements of the initial problem. Thus, denote a typical element of A ′ by π ∈ A ′ . Also, define u ′ as u ′ (t, v, π, µ) def = max a∈π v∈V β A (t)(v) · u(t, v, a, µ). By Proposition 1, a perception equilibrium (σ ′ , τ ) exists for (T, V, A ′ , u ′ , β).
Let us now return to the perception game with partitions (T, V, A, u, β, Π), and observe that, for a fixed τ , the inactive player cannot differentiate between any pair of actions a, a ′ ∈ Π(a). Thus, these actions both leave the perception unchanged, and so the perception τ (Π(a)) is well defined for every a ∈ A. Consider the strategy profile σ, where σ t (a) =    σ ′ t (Π(a)), if a = arg max a ′ ∈Π(a) v∈V β A (t)(v) · u(t, v, a ′ , τ t (v, Π(a ′ ))), 0, otherwise (if the arg max a ′ ∈Π(a) consists of more than one element, fix one arbitrarily). We claim that (σ, τ ) is a perception equilibrium under Π in (T, V, A, u, β, Π). Note first that consistency is immediate from the fact that (σ ′ , τ ) is a perception equilibrium in (T, V, A ′ , u ′ , β), and so σ ′ is consistent. Next, suppose towards a contradiction that σ is not a best-reply profile, and there exists t ∈ T andσ ∈ ∆(A) such that U (t,σ, τ t ) > U (t, σ t , τ t ). Now, if for each π it holds that a ′ ∈πσ (a ′ ) = a ′ ∈π σ t (a ′ ), then U (t, σ t , τ t ) ≥ U (t,σ, τ t ), since σ t (a) was defined as the expected utility maximizer over all a ∈ π. This contradicts the assumption that U (t,σ, τ t ) > U (t, σ t , τ t ), completing the proof.
Otherwise, let U ′ (t, σ ′ t , τ t ) = π∈Π(·),v∈V σ ′ t (π) · β A (t)(v) · u ′ (t, v, π, τ t (v, π)), and observe that U ′ (t, σ ′ t , τ t ) = U (t, σ t , τ t ). Next, define the strategy profileσ ′ for (T, V, A, u, β, Π) asσ ′ (π) def = a∈πσ (a), and observe that U ′ (t,σ ′ t , τ t ) ≥ U (t,σ t , τ t ). Thus,
This, however, contradicts the assumption that (σ ′ , τ ) is a perception equilibrium in (T, V, A ′ , u ′ , β).
